Reverse inference is not a fallacy per se: Cognitive processes can be inferred from functional imaging data  by Hutzler, Florian
NeuroImage 84 (2014) 1061–1069
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
NeuroImage
j ourna l homepage: www.e lsev ie r .com/ locate /yn imgReview
Reverse inference is not a fallacy per se: Cognitive processes can
be inferred from functional imaging data
Florian Hutzler ⁎
Centre for Neurocognitive Research & Department of Psychology, University of Salzburg, Hellbrunnerstr. 34, 5020 Salzburg, Austria⁎ Fax: +43 662 8044 5126.
E-mail address: ﬂorian.hutzler@sbg.ac.at.
1053-8119 © 2013 Elsevier Inc.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2012.12.075
Open access under CC BYa b s t r a c ta r t i c l e i n f oArticle history:
Accepted 29 December 2012






Brain activationWhen inferring the presence of a speciﬁc cognitive process from observed brain activation a kind of reasoning
is applied that is called reverse inference. Poldrack (2006) rightly criticized the careless use of reverse infer-
ence. As a consequence, reverse inference is assumed as intrinsically weak by many and its validity has been
increasingly regarded as limited. Although it is undisputed that the careless use of reverse inference is a
problematic practice, the current view of reverse inference is to the author's opinion overly pessimistic.
The present manuscript provides a revised formulation of reverse inference that includes an additional con-
ditional constraint that has been previously acknowledged, but so far not implemented: the task-setting. This
revised formulation I.) reveals that reverse inference can have high predictive power (as demonstrated by an
example estimation) and II.) allows an estimation of reverse inference on the basis of meta-analyses instead
of large-scale databases. It is concluded that reverse inference cannot be disregarded as a fallacy per se.
Rather, the predictive power of reverse inference can even be “decisive”—dependent on the cognitive process
of interest, the speciﬁc brain region activated, and the task-setting used.
© 2013 Elsevier Inc. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.ContentsIntroduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1061
Bayes factor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063
Functional speciﬁcity is currently assumed to be a prerequisite for reverse inference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063
The case for a revised formulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063
The revised formulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063
Example calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064
Data basis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064
Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064
Brain maps of reverse inference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064
Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064
Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065
Reverse inference is not intrinsically weak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065
Reverse inference does not depend on functional speciﬁcity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1065
For reverse inference, large-scale databases are not mandatory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1066
Reverse inference can be estimated on the basis of meta-analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068
Limitation of the example calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068
Appendix A. Revised formulation of reverse inference: worked example of the calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1068-NC-ND license.Introduction
Cognitive science attempts to model human experience and be-
havior and evidence from functional imaging studies can help to vali-
date these models. One kind of reasoning that is applied is to infer the
1062 F. Hutzler / NeuroImage 84 (2014) 1061–1069involvement of a speciﬁc cognitive process from observed brain acti-
vation during a task. This kind of reasoning is called reverse inference.
Whereas the logic of reverse inference is not problematic per se,
researchers often neglect the speciﬁcity of the activation of a brain re-
gion. As pointed out by Poldrack (2006), a speciﬁc brain region can be
activated by a wide range of cognitive processes. In such a case, it can
be problematic to infer the involvement of a speciﬁc cognitive process
from the activation of this brain region. In other words, the predictive
power of reverse inference can be low. Poldrack (2006) addressed
this potential fallacy of reverse inference, cautioned against the wide-
spread careless use of reverse inference and warned that researchers
should be circumspect in applying this kind of reasoning.
As a consequence, the validity of reverse inference has been increas-
ingly regarded as limited. Brain activation patterns are considered as a
weak indicator of the presence of a cognitive process (Poldrack, 2008,
2011) and reverse inference is assumed to be intrinsically weak (Fox
and Friston, 2012). Today, researchers applying reverse inference are
quickly regarded as falling for “the” fallacy of reverse inference—
resulting in the notion of a general fallacy of reverse inference.
Although it is undisputed that the careless use of reverse inference
is a problematic practice in neuroimaging, the current view of reverse
inference is to the author's opinion overly pessimistic. The present
manuscript aims to provide a revised formulation of reverse inference
that includes an additional (and quite essential) conditional constraint
that has been previously acknowledged, but so far not implemented:
the task-setting.Fig. 1. Estimation of reverse inference, schematic depiction of A.) the formulation as real
conditionalization by task, and C.) the revised formulation as used in the present study.The revised formulation I.) reveals that reverse inference can have
high predictive power (up to the level of being “decisive”) and II.) al-
lows an estimation of reverse inference on the basis of meta-analyses
instead of large-scale databases. Meta-analyses provide a ﬁne-grained
categorization of comparisons. This is an advantage that will become
evident when the importance of an adequate classiﬁcation of compar-
isons is discussed below.
In the following, the current formulation of reverse inference (as
provided by Poldrack, 2006) will be recapitulated. On this basis, the
case for a revised formulation will be made. In general, reverse infer-
ence allows the determination of the extent to which a certain brain
activation is indicative of the involvement of a speciﬁc cognitive pro-
cess (thereafter abbreviated as “the activation” and “the process”).
Fig. 1A indicates that the activation can either co-occur with the
process or can take place in the absence of the process. Thus, when
we back-trace the activation to the level of processes (i.e., when
drawing a reverse inference) we can follow two paths. Human rea-
soning intuitively accounts for the ﬁrst path: the probability of an ac-
tivation in the presence of the process. We acknowledge the so-called
hit-rate when we refer to studies that manipulated the process of
interest and when we analyze whether these studies observed the
activation in question. The second path is more often neglected: the
probability of an activation in the absence of the process (i.e., the
false-alarm rate). We seldom discuss studies that did not manipulate
the process of interest but nevertheless resulted in the activation in
question.ized in Poldrack (2006), B.) an experiment of thought illustrating the necessity for a
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of the process itself must also be accounted for—the so-called base
rate (see Fig. 1A). The base rate (or probability of a cognitive process
being present before observing the activation data) is also known as
the prior. Below, I will consider prior beliefs about cognitive processes
that are conditioned upon the experimental context under which the
data were acquired. This can improve the precision of reverse infer-
ence; effectively by replacing the prior beliefs (about a cognitive pro-
cess) with posterior beliefs, given the task or experimental context
eliciting those processes.
To summarize, for an estimation of reverse inference the overall
probability of the activation is necessary in a ﬁrst step. This overall
probability comprises the probability that the activation is observed
in the presence of the process [P(Act|Cog)P(Cog)] and the probability
that the activation is observed in the absence of the process [P(Act|~
Cog)P(~Cog)]—whereby both of these probabilities are already condi-
tioned on the respective priors (i.e., base rates, the underlined part of
the formulation). Thus, the overall probability of the activation can
be estimated as:
P Actð Þ ¼ P Act Cogj ÞP Cogð Þ þ P Act e Cog P e Cog : ð1Þ
In a next step, the probability of the activation in the presence of
the process [i.e., the ﬁrst path; the hit rate conditioned on the prior,
P(Act|Cog)P(Cog)] is qualiﬁed by the overall probability of the activa-
tion (as provided in Eq. (1)). The resulting formulation (Eq. (2)) al-
lows us to estimate the predictive quality of reverse inference.
P CogjActð Þ ¼ P ActjCogð ÞP Cogð Þ
P Act Cogj ÞP Cogð Þ þ P Act e Cog P e Cog  ð2Þ
Bayes factor
Whereas hit- and false-alarm rates can be determined by appro-
priate databases, the priors for the presence of the process remain un-
known. Poldrack (2006) provided an elegant solution which allows
us to circumvent this problem. Poldrack resorted to the basic ques-
tion, whether the presence of the activation provides additional, sub-
stantial evidence for the presence of the process that goes beyond the
prior belief about (i.e., the mere base rate of) the process itself.
To do so, Poldrack sets the (unknown) prior belief about the process
to an arbitrary constant value (e.g., chance level). The substance of re-
verse inference can now be formalized by means of the Bayes factor: To
determine the Bayes factor, the odds [i.e., P/(1−P)] for the presence of
the process given the activation (i.e., the odds of reverse inference, the
numerator in Eq. (3)) are qualiﬁed by the odds of the prior belief about
the process (i.e., the base rate, the denominator in Eq. (3)).







The higher the Bayes factor, the greater the predictive quality of
reverse inference is. Bayes factors up to 3 are interpreted as “barely
worth mentioning” and Bayes factors from 3 to 10 are interpreted as
“substantial” (Jeffreys, 1967).
Functional speciﬁcity is currently assumed to be a prerequisite for
reverse inference
Up to now, a one-to-one correspondence between a brain activa-
tion and a cognitive process is assumed to be a prerequisite for reverse
inference. The activation of a speciﬁc brain region is only regarded as
indicative for the presence of a speciﬁc cognitive process, if this regionis exclusively activated by this very process—but not by alternative
processes (as speciﬁed by functional speciﬁcity, see Cohen and
Dehaene, 2004; Dehaene and Cohen, 2011; Kanwisher, 2010).
Functional speciﬁcity is integrated into the above formulation of re-
verse inference by the deﬁnition of the false-alarm rate: False-alarms are
all cases during which an activation was observed in the absence of the
process—nomatter in which experimental context. Such a deﬁnition of
false-alarms requires considering every functional imaging ever being
reported—that is, the universe of all comparisons.
Obviously, taking into account all comparisons calls for large-scale
databases that try to comprise as many comparisons reported in the lit-
erature as possible—such as BrainMap (Fox et al., 2005) or NeuroSynth
(Yarkoni et al., 2011). Reverse inference in Poldrack (2006), for exam-
ple, was estimated on the basis of all comparisons included in the
BrainMap database.
The case for a revised formulation
A thought experiment, however, reveals that reverse inference is
not dependent on functional speciﬁcity, but rather is dependent on
what one might call “task-speciﬁc functional speciﬁcity”. To illustrate,
let us assume that an area in the left occipito-temporal region, more
speciﬁcally, the left fusiform gyrus, is known to be activated by two
different processes: a.) access to the mental lexicon (i.e., the recogni-
tion of visual words) and b.) face perception.
Let us now assume that a hypothetical experiment during which
participants are presented with visual words results in an activation of
this left fusiform gyrus (see Fig. 1B). Applying the standard formulation
of reverse inference, we could now try to resolve, which cognitive pro-
cesses are likely to co-occur with this activation. We would back-trace
from the level of activation to the level of cognitive processes. Doing so
would reveal an equally high probability that the observed activation
might be indicative for either access to the mental lexicon or for face
perception. This ﬁnding would imply that activation in the left fusiform
gyrus would only provide weak additional evidence for processes
related to “visual word recognition”, because the observed activation
could also be indicative for processes related to “face perception”.
Intuitively, however, one would rule out processes of “face per-
ception” and would settle with the conclusion that the observed acti-
vation is indicative of “visual word recognition”. In what respect does
this intuitive reasoning differ from the standard formulation of re-
verse inference? Intuitively, one would take the task setting into ac-
count: Being presented with visual words would render processes
related to face perception as unlikely to occur.
This additional information about the task being performed allows
us to formalize the experimental situation more accurately. Obviously,
it improves the precision of reverse inference as it narrows the number
of possible alternative explanations (technically: reduces the false
alarm rate). Importantly, the necessity of taking the task setting into
account has already been acknowledged by Poldrack, stating that “[…]
it should be noted that the prior P(Cogx) is always conditioned on
the particular task being used, and should more properly be termed
P(Cogx|Tasky); however, for the purposes of simplicity I have omitted
this additional conditionalization.” (Poldrack, 2006, p. 60). In the
present manuscript, a revised formulation will be presented that takes
into account this important additional constraint.
The revised formulation
Additionally conditioning by task has a massive impact on the for-
mulation and thus the estimation of reverse inference. To illustrate,
the level of the task being performed is added in Fig. 1C. Comparing
Fig. 1C to A reveals that we are no longer interested in the probability
by which the process occurs in any arbitrary situation. Rather, we are
interested in the probability by which the process occurs during a spe-
ciﬁc task. More speciﬁcally, we are no longer interested in prior beliefs
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are conditioned upon the experimental context under which the data
were acquired, i.e., the base rate conditioned on task, P(Cog|Task)].
Thus, when revising the formulation provided in Eq. (2), the poste-
rior belief is taken into account. The hit rate is now conditioned on the
posterior [resulting in P(Act|Cog∩Task)P(Cog|Task)]. This conditioned
hit rate is then qualiﬁed by the overall probability of the activation,
whereby nowwe are interested in the overall probability of the activa-
tion during the task [i.e., in P(Act|Cog∩Task)P(Cog|Task)+P(Act|~
Cog∩Task)P(~Cog|Task)]. The resulting formulation in Eq. (4) now
estimates reverse inferencewhile taking into account the task-setting:
P CogjAct∩Taskð Þ
¼ P ActjCog∩Taskð ÞP CogjTaskð Þ
P Act Cog∩Taskj ÞP Cog Taskj Þ þ P Act eCog∩Taskj ÞP eCog Taskj Þ:ðððð ð4Þ
In essence, the formulation of reverse inference in Eq. (4) is analogous
to that in Eq. (2), but is additionally conditioned on task. Conditioning by
task does not affect the estimation of reverse inference via a different
probability for the presence of the process. The probability for the pres-
ence of the process (whether conditioned on task or not) is regarded as
unknownand thus still is set to an arbitrary value (even though the prob-
ability of “access to the mental lexicon” might be higher given “being
presented with visual words” than without such a task).
Conditioning by task, rather, affects the estimation of reverse infer-
ence in an indirect way. Fig. 1B (depicting the above experiment of
thought) illustrates that acknowledging for the task “being presented
with visual words” reduces the probability that the process “face per-
ception” is among the non-“visual word recognition” process [i.e., to
be among ~Cog; whereby it is important to note that P(~Cog) remains
unchanged and is set to an arbitrary level]. This reduced probability for
“face perception” to be among the non-“visual word recognition” pro-
cesses lowers the probability for a fusiform activation taking place in
the absence of visual word recognition processes. In consequence, for
our thought experiment, fusiform activation would be quite indicative
of visual word recognition. Thus, the precision of reverse inference for
revised formulation is increased due to a more accurate task-speciﬁc
false-alarm rate.
The important consequence for the estimation of reverse infer-
ence is that the search space for false alarms is restricted: Of interest
are no longer all activations of the left fusiform gyrus in the absence of
visual word recognition. Rather, of interest are now the activations
that occur in the absence of visual word recognition processes, but
in the experimental context of “being presented with visual words”.
Example calculation
The current formulation of reverse inference is based on functional
speciﬁcity and thus needs to account for all available comparisons to
calculate the false-alarm rate—thus demanding large-scale database
such as BrainMap. In contrast, the revised formulation is based on
task-speciﬁc functional speciﬁcity and thus a task-speciﬁc false-
alarm rate. As a consequence, the revised formulation allows us to re-
sort to a more specialized data basis that is obtained for a speciﬁc task,
such as, e.g., a meta analysis. A meta analysis, being compiled by re-
searchers with expertise in the respective domain, provides a ﬁne-
grained cognitive analysis of the processes involved in a comparison.
The discussion will address why accurately specifying whether a com-
parison isolates a speciﬁc process or not is the prerequisite for a reli-
able estimation of reverse inference.
Data basis
For the example calculation, a recent meta analysis by Vigneau et
al. (2006) was chosen. This meta analysis is dedicated to left hemi-
spheric language processing and reports 729 activation peaks from260 individual comparisons based on 129 studies. Using this study,
the example calculation of reverse inference will be conditioned
on the task setting “language processing”. Obviously, a more speciﬁc
(and thusmore restrictive) conditioning by, e.g., “visual word recogni-
tion” could have been chosen which would have resulted in even
higher predictive quality. The lenient conditioning by “language pro-
cessing”, however, is sufﬁcient for this exploratory estimation.
Importantly, Vigneau et al. only included comparisons which aimed
at isolating a speciﬁc cognitive process, whereas low-level contrasts
(e.g., against baseline) were not included. To illustrate, a comparison
classiﬁed as, e.g., phonological comparison speciﬁcally targeted phono-
logical processing but did not isolate, e.g., semantic processing. Three
different classes of cognitive processes were deﬁned in Vigneau et al.:
phonological, semantic, and sentence processing.
Analysis
The 729 activation peaks provided in Vigneau et al.'s supplementa-
ry material were aggregated to the level of the 260 comparisons. For
estimation, a sphere with a predeﬁned radius of 10 voxels around
the coordinate of interest was searched for the presence of activation
peaks. Upon these activation peaks, the hit-rates (i.e., based on activa-
tion peaks observed during the process of interest) and false-alarm
rates (i.e., based on activation peaks observed during the absence of
the process of interest) are calculated—whereby these probabilities
are estimated on the level of comparisons, not individual activation
peaks. These rates are automatically conditioned on task due to the
task-speciﬁc data basis chosen. Importantly, since the task-setting refers
to the subset of tasks included in Vigneau et al., the task variable was
constant throughout the analyses. On the basis of these probabilities,
reverse inferencewas calculated along the revised formulation provided
in Eq. (4). A calculation was only performed when a minimum of 5
activation peaks was located within the sphere. If fewer peaks were
present, the Bayes factor for this speciﬁc coordinate was determined as
“not supporting” the presence of a process (i.e., Bayes factor 0).
Brain maps of reverse inference
For the example calculation, the Bayes factor was calculated analog to
Eq. (3)'s logic. However, since the revised formulation is conditioned
upon the experimental context, the prior was replaced by the posterior
(i.e., the task-speciﬁc base rate). Thus, the odds of reverse inference as es-
timated by the revised formulation (the numerator in Eq. (5)) are quali-
ﬁedby the odds of the posterior (the denominator in Eq. (5)). Appendix A
provides a worked example of the example calculation for a single voxel.
Bayesfactorrevised reverse inference ¼
P CogjAct∩ Taskð Þ
1−P CogjAct∩ Taskð Þ

P CogjTaskð Þ
1−P Cog Taskj Þð
ð5Þ
The Bayes factor was calculated for every voxel in the brain and
brain maps of reverse inference were generated for demonstrative
purposes. These brainmaps provide an example atlas of the predictive
quality of reverse inference for a speciﬁc cognitive process (as classi-
ﬁed by Vigneau et al.), revealing, for which coordinates a reliable re-
verse inference is possible, and for which not.
Results
For visualization of reverse inference, only Bayes factors which pro-
vide “strong” evidence (i.e., >=10) are indicated. Because of the de-
monstrative purpose of the estimation, brain maps are only presented
cursorily. Vigneau et al.'smeta analysis only served as a test-bed and fu-
ture studies might resort to even more specialized meta-analyses. Fur-
thermore, it is important to note that Vigneau et al.'s meta analysis
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ited to left hemispheric language processing (Figs. 2–4).
Discussion
Reverse inference is not intrinsically weak
Currently, reverse inference is considered as generally being of
poor predictive power and as being intrinsically weak. An example
calculation on the basis of the revised formulation, however, revealed
a more differentiated pattern of results: Activations in certain brainFig. 2. Brain maps indicating the predictive power of reverse inference for phonological proc
located in the left precentral region, elongating dorsoventrally from z=10 to z=54. A seco
z=23. The strength of reverse inference is “decisive” (i.e., a Bayes factors>=20) for the mregions can provide even “decisive” evidence for the presence of a
speciﬁc cognitive process. For other areas, no such reverse inference
can be drawn. Thus, the present study suggests that reverse inference
is not a fallacy per se. Rather, its reliability is dependent on the cogni-
tive process of interest, the task-setting used—and has to be individu-
ally estimated for the speciﬁc brain activation in question.
Reverse inference does not depend on functional speciﬁcity
Whether the logic of reverse inference is feasible for the interpreta-
tion of a study depends on our intended interpretive direction: Do weessing. Two coherent clusters could be identiﬁed in the left hemisphere. A ﬁrst cluster is
nd cluster is located in the perisylvian region, elongating dorsoventrally from z=3 to
ajority of the voxels in both clusters.
Fig. 3. Brain maps indicating the predictive power of reverse inference for semantic processing. A single cluster of voxels (providing “decisive” evidence) in the area around the
fusiform gyrus was found to be indicative for semantic processing.
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others) to decide among competing theories for human behavior? If
so, then we want to know, whether a speciﬁc brain activation assessed
under speciﬁc circumstances can be indicative for the presence of a cer-
tain cognitive process. More speciﬁcally, we want to know whether
during a speciﬁc task, an activation is indicative for a speciﬁc cognitive
process. For such reasoning it is not problematic when this very brain
region is also activated by other cognitive processes during a different
task. To illustrate, an area activated by the process “visualword recogni-
tion” and the process “face recognition” can be indicative for “visual
word recognition” as long as the stimuli are words but not faces.
Taken together, the differences between the current and the re-
vised formulation of reverse inference can be boiled down to one
core issue: Functional speciﬁcity is a prerequisite for the current for-
mulation of reverse inference. The fact that the “same [brain] struc-
ture can be assigned very different functions” (Poldrack, 2012) was
regarded as the fundamental problem for reverse inference. In con-
trast, the revised formulation is conditioned on the task-setting used
and, in consequence, is no more dependent on a one-to-one corre-
spondence between a brain activation and a cognitive process.The necessity of conditioning by task has already been acknowl-
edged by Poldrack (2006, p. 60), but not implemented up to now. To
this end, the revised formulation is the logical further development
of the current formulation. The revised formulation allows us to for-
malize the experimental context more accurately and results in a con-
siderably increased precision of reverse inference. Conditioning by
task therefore seems not only optional, but even mandatory: Every
piece of information that helps to increase the predictive quality of re-
verse inference needs to be accounted for—and the task-setting is such
a quintessential piece of information.For reverse inference, large-scale databases are not mandatory
The formulation of reverse inference does not only determine its
predictive power. Rather, it also determines upon which kind of
data-basis reverse inference can be estimated. The current formula-
tion of reverse inference requires the inclusion of as many compari-
sons as possible, with the ultimate goal of accounting for every valid
comparison ever being published. Obviously, large-scale databases
Fig. 4. Brain maps indicating the predictive power of reverse inference for sentence processing. A small cluster providing “strong”, but not “decisive”, evidence was found in the
temporal pole.
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2011) are necessary for such an approach.
Estimating reverse inference on the basis of large-scale databases,
however, is error-prone. The key to a reliable calculation of reverse in-
ference is an adequate classiﬁcation of comparisons. On the one hand,
we need to identify the comparisons that isolate a speciﬁc process,
thus constituting the hit-rate. On the other hand, we need to identify
those comparisons that deﬁnitely do not isolate this process, thus con-
stituting the false-alarm rate. Given the variety of alternative process-
es that can be isolated by the comparisons that comprise the false-
alarm rate, it is easily overseen that this second group of comparisons
must under no circumstance isolate the process of interest.
Such an adequate classiﬁcation is not always possible on the basis of
large-scale databases. This problem can be exempliﬁed by BrainMap's
behavioral domain code, which was used in previous estimations of
reverse inference. This code classiﬁes the mental operations (cognitive
processes among other operations) that are intended to be isolated
by a statistical contrast (Laird et al., 2005). Importantly, there is no ex-
clusive mapping between the code and a speciﬁc cognitive process.
Rather, the code speciﬁeswhether a comparisonwas intended to isolateone or many processes that belong to a certain domain, irrespective of
whether such a comparisonmight also isolate other processes that are re-
lated to other domains. Thus, a code comprises a heterogeneous compi-
lation of comparisons that differ with respect to the type and sheer
number of processes being isolated.
To illustrate, concerning the hit-rate: a comparison classiﬁed by
the code X does not necessarily isolate only the process Cogx, but
might also isolate processes like Cogy that result in unforeseeable
additional activations. Concerning the false-alarm rate, a comparison
classiﬁed by the domain code Y might (beneath the intended process
Cogy) also isolate an uncalled-for process Cogx—with the foreseeable,
additional activation Actx that would misleadingly be rated as a
false-alarm.
Thus, BrainMap's behavioral domain code (originally not intended
to fulﬁll the speciﬁc requirements for reverse inference) is not ade-
quate to estimate reverse inference. When one considers the universe
of all existing comparisons and the number of cognitive processes
that are potentially of interest, then the dimension (not to say impos-
sibility) of a universal classiﬁcation system that is suitable for reverse
inference becomes evident.
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In contrast, the revised formulation (being conditioned on task) al-
lows an estimation of reverse inference on the basis of specialized
meta-analyses. Meta analyses provide the advantage of a ﬁne-grained
categorization of comparisons on the basis of a cognitive analysis
done by experts in the respective domain. This categorization is a pre-
requisite for a reliable estimation of reverse inference. Thus, additional-
ly conditioning by task relieves us from going for mass, but allows us to
go for detail.
Limitation of the example calculation
Importantly, the present manuscript's example calculation is only
for demonstrative purpose: Vigneau et al.'s (2006) meta-analysis
only served as a test bed for the revised formulation. The categoriza-
tion used is rather coarse, distinguishing between phonological, se-
mantic, and sentence processing. Moreover, the task-setting used for
conditioning (i.e., language-processing) is quite broad. Future studies
might want to resort to more specialized meta-analyses that narrow
the conditioned task setting and provide a more restricted categoriza-
tion of comparisons. Obviously, such a more specialized data-basis
will further improve the predictive quality of reverse inference.
The revised formulation, however, also implicates an important
constraint: When reasoning along reverse inference, no cross-task in-
ferences are admissible since the task-setting is the additional condi-
tional constraint.
Up to now, the discussion on reverse inference focused on the
speciﬁcity of an activation, i.e., the questionwhether reverse inference
is possible if a speciﬁc brain region is activated by more than one cog-
nitive process. The effect of cognitive degeneracy (Price and Friston,
2002), however, was not acknowledged yet: a structure–function re-
lationship in which more than one neuronal system produces the
same response. Most probably, the impact of cognitive degeneracy
on the predictive quality of reverse inference might depend on the
grain-size of the cognitive process of interest (e.g., “reading” or more
speciﬁcally “grapheme–phoneme conversion”). This question demands
a closer examination which is beyond the scope of this manuscript.
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Appendix A. Revised formulation of reverse inference: worked
example of the calculation
The present manuscript's example calculation is based on a meta-
analysis performed by Vigneau et al. (2006). In the supplementary
material, Vigneau et al. (2006) report 729 activation peaks, whereby
247 of these peaks correspond to phonological processing and 482
peaks correspond to non-phonological processing. These peaks result
from 260 comparisons, whereby 74 of these comparisons were per-
formed to isolate phonological processes and 186 of these compari-
sons were performed to isolate non-phonological processes. It is
important to note that the probabilities used for the estimation of re-
verse inference are estimated on the level of comparisons, but not on
the level of individual activation peaks. For the worked example, let
us consider the coordinate−60,−17,16. Within a sphere of 10 voxels
around (i.e., Euclidean distance to) this coordinate, activation peaks
from 8 different comparisons can be found. 7 of these comparisons
targeted phonological processing, 1 of these comparisons targeted
non-phonological processing.On the basis of these numbers, we can now estimate the following
probabilities:
● The task-speciﬁc hit rate, P(Act|Cog⋂Task): During the presence
of phonological processes, an activation within this sphere could
be observed in 7 out of 74 comparisons, i.e., P(Act|Cog⋂Task)=
7/74 (≈ .0946)
● The task-speciﬁc false-alarm rate, P(Act|~Cog⋂Task): During the ab-
sence of phonological processing, an activation in this sphere could
be observed in 1 out of 186 comparisons, i.e., P(Act|~Cog⋂Task)=
1/186 (≈ .0054)
● Theposterior beliefs about cognitive processes (i.e., prior beliefs about
cognitive processes conditioned upon the experimental context or:
the task-speciﬁc base-rate) are unknown and thus are set to an arbi-
trary level, P(Cog|Task)=.5 and P(~Cog|Task)=.5, respectively.
We can now resort to Eq. (4) (the revised formulation of reverse
inference) to estimate the predictive quality of reverse inference:
P CogjAct∩Taskð Þ ¼ P ActjCog∩Taskð ÞP CogjTaskð Þ














Thus, the predictive quality of reverse inference is .95. In other
words, when we observe an activation at the example coordinate
we can (under the given experimental conditions) conclude with a
probability of .95 upon the presence of a phonological process. Using
Eq. (5), we can now estimate, whether the presence of an activation
provides additional, substantial evidence for the presence of a phono-
logical process that goes beyond the mere posterior belief about the
process (i.e., the task-speciﬁc base-rate):
Bayes factorrevised reverse inference
¼
P CogjAct∩ Taskð Þ











A Bayes factor of 17.6 reveals that observing an activation at this
coordinate provides “strong evidence” for the presence of a phono-
logical process that goes beyond the mere posterior belief about the
process itself. In consequence, in the brain maps indicating predictive
power of reverse inference for phonological processing, the voxel at
−60,−17,16 is set to a value of 17.6.
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